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THE CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Erwin Chemerinsky*
Boumediene v. Bush' was decided on June 12th of this year.
The case involved the constitutionality of provisions in the Detainee
Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which
provide that noncitizens held as enemy combatants shall not have ac-
cess to habeas corpus.2 To understand this decision it is necessary to
put the history, albeit recent, in context.
As soon as the first individuals were brought to Guantanamo
in January of 2002, lawsuits began to be filed on their behalf.3 The
Supreme Court took up a group of these cases on behalf of Guan-
tanamo detainees, ultimately leading to Rasul v. Bush4 in June of
2004. The Bush Administration took the position in all of the Guan-
tanamo litigation that Guantanamo detainees could not come to fed-
eral court via a writ of habeas corpus because habeas corpus did not
apply outside of the United States. 5 The government relied on John-
. Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
This Article is based on a presentation given at the Practising Law Institute's Tenth Annual
Supreme Court Review Program in New York, New York.
' 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1001, 119 Stat. 2739 (codi-
fied primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1 (West 2008)); Military Commissions Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of
10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.A.).
3 I should disclose here that I argued the first case on behalf of Guantanamo detainees in
Federal District Court in February of 2000, and then in the Ninth Circuit in July of 2002. I
have also been representing an individual Guantanamo detainee since the Summer of 2002.
4 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
' Id. at 472-73.
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6son v. Eisentrager, a case decided in 1950. Eisentrager involved a
group of German nationals who were apprehended in China at the
end of World War II. The group was engaged in helping Japan in the
war effort. These individuals were tried in military commissions,
convicted, and sought access to federal court via the writ of habeas
corpus.7 The Supreme Court ruled against them.8 Justice Jackson
wrote the opinion for the Court and reasoned the United States had
complied with a national law that these individuals receive due proc-
ess in the form of military tribunals; they were individuals who had
never been in the United States, were apprehended outside of the
United States, were held outside of the United States, and therefore
habeas corpus was not available. 9 In every Guantanamo case, the
Bush Administration relied on Eisentrager; the government argued
that those in Guantanamo should not have access to federal court via
the writ of habeas corpus. 10 In fact, Paul Clement, then a deputy so-
licitor general, went everywhere in the country advancing this posi-
tion on behalf of the United States against Guantanamo detainees."
In June of 2004, the Supreme Court decided a number of
Guantanamo cases.' 2 The cases were argued in April and there were
very dramatic exchanges between Justices Ginsburg and Breyer and
6 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Id. at 765-66.
8 Id. at 781 ("[W]e arrive at the same conclusion the Court reached in each of those cases,
viz.: that no right to the writ of habeas corpus appears.").
9 Id. at 777-78.
10 See, e.g., Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Guantanamo De-
tainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (D.D.C. 2005). In these cases and many others, the
government relied primarily on Eisentrager.
1 See Vanessa Blum, Point Man, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1073944820670.
12 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466.
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former Solicitor Generals Theodore Olson and Paul Clement. Justice
Ginsburg asked whether the individuals in Guantanamo could ever
have access to federal court?13 Solicitor General Olson replied that
habeas jurisdiction does not apply.' 4  Justice Breyer then asked
whether individuals could be held there for their entire lives and
never have access to federal habeas corpus? 15 Solicitor General Ol-
son stated he did not expect their detention to last that long. He
added that nonetheless, he did not believe there was any jurisdiction
over their claims.' 6 Justice Ginsburg, perplexed, questioned the gov-
ernment's argument concerning whether the detainees would ever
have access to federal courts through habeas corpus if they are tor-
tured.' 7 Solicitor General Clement responded by saying the Ameri-
can military would never engage in torture.' 8 By pure coincidence,
the night the oral argument was held was the same day first reports of
torture at Abu Ghraib arose. 19 I have often wondered if that coinci-
dence had any effect on the outcome of the case.
In June of 2004, by a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court
held those who were held in Guantanamo do have access to federal
13 Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Detainees, 68 ALB. L. REv. 1119, 1121-22 (2005) (describing the col-
loquy).
14 Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1121-22.
15 Transcript of Oral Arguments at 26, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696).
16 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
17 Transcript of Oral Arguments at 26, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
18 Id.
19 60 Minutes II was the first of many media outlets who reported on torture at Abu
Ghraib. A transcript of the broadcast can be viewed on the CBS website,
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court via habeas corpus.2 ° Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the
Court. The three dissenters were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas.2' Justice Stevens' opinion distinguished
Eisentrager. He pointed out that Johnson had been tried in a military
tribunal, whereas those held at Guantanamo had not received any trial
at all.22 He also pointed out that Guantanamo is functionally an
American sovereignty, whereas the territory where the individuals
were apprehended in Eisentrager was not.23
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he
stressed the functional difference between Guantanamo and Eisen-
trager, or other foreign battlefields. 24  Justice Kennedy was con-
cerned about anyone held by the American military as a prisoner of
war anywhere in the world having access to federal habeas corpus.
2 5
For him, what made this case different was the ways in which Guan-
tanamo is functionally part of American sovereignty. Six-to-three,
the Supreme Court held that those in Guantanamo shall have access
to federal court via the writ of habeas corpus.2 6 At this point, all of
the cases were in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 7
The district court judges in the District of Columbia got to-
gether and decided it made sense to consolidate the cases for pur-
20 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473, 484.
21 Id. at 488.
22 Id. at 476.
23 Id. at 480-82.
24 Id. at 487-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 486, 488.
26 Id. at 468, 485 (majority opinion).
27 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
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poses of pretrial proceedings before one judge, rather than have al-
most every judge on the District of Columbia District Court handling
the same procedural motions. 28 There were enough of these cases,
probably seventy altogether, that almost every one of the district
court judges had some of them. 29 All of the cases were consolidated
before Judge Joyce Hens Green, except that no judge was forced to
relinquish his other cases.30 One judge, Judge Richard Leon, refused
to do so. 31 There were two judges hearing these cases for the District
of Columbia district court. Judge Green was hearing approximately
sixty of them labeled together under Khalid v. Bush,32 and Judge
Leon was hearing about ten of them under the label Boumediene v.
Bush. The United States Government moved to dismiss all of the
cases on the grounds that there was no cause of action either under
the Constitution or under international law.33
Judge Leon granted the government's motion to dismiss in
January of 2005. 34 Judge Green denied the motion to dismiss finding
a cause of action under both the Federal Constitution and interna-
tional law. Green did however grant an interlocutory review. She
certified the questions to the District of Columbia Circuit.35 The
cases were heard in the District of Columbia Circuit Court on De-
cember 8, 2005, and everyone anxiously awaited the decision. Not
28 Id. at 451.
29 See Judges-U.S District Court, Washington, DC, http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/judge-
info.html.
30 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241.
31 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 452 n. 14.
32 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
33 See, e.g., Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
34 Id. at 330.
35 Abdah v. Bush, No. Civ.A. 04-1254(HHK), 2005 WL 711814, at *2 (D.D.C. 2005).
20091
5
Chemerinsky: The Constitution and National Security
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2009
TOURO LAWREVIEW
that long after though, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005.36
The Detainee Treatment Act stated that noncitizens held as
enemy combatants shall not have access to federal court via habeas
corpus.37 They would have to go through a military proceeding, and
then go to the District of Columbia Circuit Court for review.38 In the
District of Columbia Circuit Court, review can be based only upon
claims made under the Constitution and government statute; the court
could not hear claims based on international law like the Geneva
courts.39 In June of 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,4 ° the Supreme
Court ruled five-to-three that the Detainee Treatment Act applied
only prospectively. 41 It did not apply retroactively to individuals who
were already at Guantanamo.42 It appeared the Guantanamo cases
pending before the District of Columbia Circuit Court could finally
proceed.
In October of 2006, Congress passed the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006.43 The Military Commissions Act states that non-
citizens held as enemy combatants shall not have access to federal
courts via habeas corpus or otherwise; however, if there is a military
tribunal, detainees could seek review of the tribunal's decision in the
36 Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136.
31 Id. § 1405(e)(1)(e).
31 Id. § 1405(e)(2)(A-B).
39 Id. § 1405(e)(3)(D).
40 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
41 Id. at 576.
42 Id. at 576, 578.
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District of Columbia Circuit Court." The way the law is written, a
military commission or tribunal is never required; it simply states that
if there is one, then there can be a review in the District of Columbia
Circuit Court. Similar to the Detainee Treatment Act, the Military
Commissions Act says review can only be based on the Constitution
and federal statute-it cannot be based on international law like the
Geneva courts.45
In February of 2007, the District of Columbia Circuit Court,
in a two-to-one decision, upheld the constitutionality of the law, re-
jecting the argument that it is an unconstitutional suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.4 6 In April of 2007, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Justices Ginsburg and Souter said they would grant expe-
dited review, and Justice Breyer said he would grant certiorari; so
there were three votes for certiorari, but not the necessary four.47 Jus-
tices Stevens and Kennedy joined an opinion respecting the denial of
certiorari. They agreed these individuals should go through the mili-
tary tribunal, and then go to the District of Columbia Circuit Court
for review where they could raise their constitutional issues.48
The attorneys for the detainees then made an unusual deci-
sion. They asked the Supreme Court to reverse itself, and grant cer-
tiorari even after it had been denied.49 It had been at least sixty years
44 Id. §§ 950g(a), 950j(b).
41 Id. at §§ 948b(g), 950g(c), § 2241(5)(a).
46 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
47 Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479 (2007).
41 Id. at 1478.
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since the Supreme Court last granted certiorari in this manner.50 The
Guantanamo lawyers felt they had no alternative, as the process of-
fered was deficient, and they were concerned that the issue had not
been reported in the press. 5' The Justice Department informed the at-
torneys for all of the Guantanamo detainees that if the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit were affirmed, they would no longer represent those
in Guantanamo.52 All of the lawyers, including myself, are habeas
lawyers. If there is no habeas petition pending, we are no longer the
attorneys for these individuals, and they are only entitled to military
lawyers. It is possible the military lawyers are wonderful lawyers,
but the detainees would be deprived of the firms that were represent-
ing them as habeas lawyers. That gave the lawyers for the detainees
further incentive to make the unusual request of asking the Supreme
Court to reverse itself.
Surprisingly, on June 29, 2007, the Supreme Court reversed
itself and granted certiorari. Oral arguments were held on December
6, 2007. On June 12, 2008, the decision came down. 53 Consistent
with the theme of this term, it was five-to-four, and Justice Kennedy
wrote the opinion for the Court. He was joined by Justices Souter,
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.54 He said the Constitution, in Article
I, Section 9, allows Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in
50 Frank J. Williams et al., Still a Frightening Unknown: Achieving a Constitutional Bal-
ance Between Civil Liberties and National Security During the War on Terror, 12 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 675, 680 (2007).
51 Mehmet Mfinir, Note, The Future of Judicial Review for the Detainees of the War on
Terrorism After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 36 CAP. U. L. REv. 159, 201 n.361 (2007).
52 Carrie Newton Lyons et al., National Security, 42 INT'L LAW. 811, 812 (2008).
53 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2229.
54 Id. at 2239.
[Vol. 25
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cases of rebellion and invasion. He said the instant case is not of re-
bellion or invasion, rather it is a suspension of the writ of habeas cor-
pus. 55 The Military Commissions Act and the Detainee Treatment
Act by their very terms say that individuals cannot go to federal court
with a writ of habeas corpus.56 He stressed, as he did in Rasul, that
Guantanamo is functionally under United States sovereignty. 57 His
opinions traced in some detail the history of Guantanamo.
Justice Kennedy's opinion explained why this statute was not
an adequate substitute, though he did not say there can never be an
adequate substitute. 58 I think the question is, if there were an alterna-
tive procedure that supplies everything that habeas supplies, would it
still be a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus? The Court did not
have to deal with that here. Justice Kennedy went on to explain why
the review in the District of Columbia Circuit is an inadequate substi-
tute for habeas corpus.59
Finally, he said the provisions that are allowed to provide for
review in the statute, and review in the District of Columbia Circuit
in military proceeding decisions, do not substitute for writ of habeas
corpus. 60 Towards the end of his opinion, in language similar to that
which he uses in other cases, he talked about how the Constitution
has to be followed even in times of crisis.61 Constitutional values
5 Id. at 2246.
56 Id. at 2240.
57 Id. at 2252-53.
58 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274.
" Id. at 2272.
60 Id. at 2272-73.
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must be preserved; the rules of law must be applied, even in the con-
text of the war on terrorism, the Constitution does not allow a sus-
pension of the great writ-the writ of habeas corpus.6 2
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia wrote dissenting
opinions, in which both Justices Thomas and Alito joined.63 Justice
Scalia's opinion was particularly vehement. He said people will die
as a result of this decision.64 He said individuals will be released
from Guantanamo, and they will "return to kill" and commit further
acts of terrorism. 65 He said this is not an appropriate place for the
federal courts to get involved. This is a matter appropriately left to
the President and Congress.66 The courts get involved not just at their
peril, but at the peril of the entire nation.67
Underlying both the majority and the dissent were different
perspectives about the appropriate role of the federal courts in the
war on terror. For the five Justices of the majority, it was essential
that the Supreme Court and federal court be involved to insure com-
pliance with the Constitution and rule of law. 68 For Justice Scalia in
the dissent, this is an issue in which the federal judiciary has no busi-
ness being involved.69
62 id.
63 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279, 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 2294-95 ("[The decision] will almost certainly cause more Americans to be
killed.") (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 2296 ("What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of
Congress and the President on such a point?").
67 See id.
68 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (majority opinion).
69 Id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
586 [Vol. 25
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